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Descartes’s Indefinitely Extended Universe 
 
JASPER REID King’s College London 
 
ABSTRACT: Descartes believed the extended world did not terminate in a boundary: but why? 
After elucidating Descartes’s position in §1, suggesting his conception of the indefinite 
extension of the universe should be understood as actual but syncategorematic, we turn in §2 
to his argument: any postulation of an outermost surface for the world will be self-defeating, 
because merely contemplating such a boundary will lead us to recognise the existence of 
further extension beyond it. In §3, we identify the fundamental assumption underlying this 
argument by comparing Descartes and Malebranche’s respective conceptions of the 
ontological status of modes of extension. 
 
RÉSUMÉ : Descartes croyait que le monde étendu ne se terminait pas par une borne: mais 
pourquoi? Après avoir expliqué la position de Descartes au §1, en suggérant que sa conception 
de l'extension indéfinie de l'univers devrait être entendu comme actuelle mais 
syncatégorématique, nous allons dans le §2 à son argument: tout postulation d'une surface 
extérieure pour le monde sera autodestructrice, parce que la simple contemplation d'une telle 
borne nous conduira à reconnaître l'existence d'une extension plus loin au-delà. Au §3, nous 
identifions l'hypothèse fondamentale qui sous-tend cet argument en comparant les 
conceptions respectives de Descartes et de Malebranche du statut ontologique des modes 
d'extension. 
 
Keywords: Descartes, extension, imaginary spaces, indefinite, infinite, syncatorematic, mode 
 
1. Descartes’s Theory  
 
1.1 Historical Background 
René Descartes believed that the material world was indefinitely large: it just carried on going 
ever further outwards, nowhere terminating in a boundary. Although it was not until the 
1640s that Descartes would pledge himself most explicitly and most forcefully to this doctrine, 
it was clearly a sentiment to which he had long been attracted. As early as 1629, he was 
already asking Marin Mersenne to check whether his physical opinions might cause him any 
difficulties on religious grounds. In particular, he wanted to know “whether there is anything 
definite in religion concerning the extension of created things, that is, whether it is finite or 
infinite, and whether in all these regions called ‘imaginary spaces’ there are genuine created 
bodies. Although I was not keen to touch on this topic, I believe nevertheless I shall have to 
go into it.”1 
The Church, however, was not keen on the postulation of an infinite universe. Its 
official position, here as elsewhere, had been developed and entrenched within the scholastic 
Aristotelian tradition, which strongly favoured a finite extended world. Aristotle himself had 
even gone so far as to maintain not only that the universe was finitely large, but that it did 
not even have the potential to be any larger than it actually was. Beyond the last of Aristotle’s 
fifty-five celestial spheres, there was literally nothing, neither solid matter, nor empty space, 
nor even so much as the possibility that anything should be there.2 
                                                 
1 Descartes to Mersenne, 18 December 1629 (AT I, 86; CSMK 14). 
2 Aristotle (1984) I, 462–463 (On the Heavens I.9, 279a12–16); I, 352 (Physics III.6, 206b21–7). 
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Now, those who followed Aristotle did soften this position a little. Aristotle could take 
this line because he believed that the heavens had always existed in just the same way as they 
do now. His medieval followers disagreed. They felt that the heavens had had a temporal 
creation by God, and—once they had a creator-God in the story—they further argued that 
God, if he so chose, could continue to augment the universe even now, by creating brand new 
matter beyond its current boundaries. The schoolmen continued to agree with Aristotle that 
the universe was actually only finitely extended: but considerations like this led them to allow 
that it might at least be infinitely extendable. Moreover, in the year 1277, the Church (through 
the person of Etienne Tempier, Bishop of Paris) explicitly proscribed the teaching of 219 
propositions spanning a wide variety of issues. In particular, it could no longer be taught—on 
pain of excommunication—that “the first cause cannot make more than one world” or that 
“God could not move the heaven in a straight line.”3 But any such second world would 
presumably need to be created beyond the boundaries of the current one, in a place where 
nothing as yet existed; while, for God to move the heavens, there would again need to be 
some unoccupied place for him to move them into. Imagining bodies where none actually 
existed, namely those that God could create or move there, led medieval Aristotelians to 
postulate what they called ‘imaginary spaces’ beyond the actually finite boundaries of the 
corporeal world. 
But the question was: were these spaces purely imaginary, or did they have some kind 
of extra-mental reality? And, on this, there were differences of opinion. A handful of medieval 
philosophers were willing to allow that such imaginary spaces might be genuinely extended 
in their own right, and even infinitely so, despite being (as yet) void. However, this was very 
much a minority viewpoint. Edward Grant notes that it was the opinion of Hasdai Crescas, for 
instance, but describes him as a “rare and extraordinary exception” to the general consensus.4 
According to more standard accounts, imaginary space either only properly existed in the 
mind (e.g., St Thomas Aquinas), or existed outside it only as a possibility rather than anything 
actual (e.g., Jean de Ripa), or at any rate not as actually extended. This last was explicitly 
argued by—to name but two—Nicole Oresme in the fourteenth century and the Coimbra 
commentator on the Physics in the early seventeenth.5 And it is a view to which we will return: 
for, as we will see, the same position was adopted directly in response to Descartes’s own 
discussion by critics such as Isaac Barrow and Jean-Baptiste de La Grange. 
But this was the tradition from which Descartes was consciously and deliberately 
seeking to distance himself. Crescas’s view might admittedly have played into his hands: 
although Crescas himself wanted to treat the extra-cosmic space as an infinite void, Descartes 
would have insisted that, from the sheer fact that it was extended, it would itself turn out to 
be corporeal. But, whether void or corporeal, most of Descartes’s predecessors—Nicholas of 
Cusa and Giordano Bruno being notable exceptions, following the ancient atomists and 
Stoics—refused to allow that there was any actual extension at all beyond the finite boundary 
of the corporeal universe. And yet this was precisely what Descartes asserted. For him, it was 
not just that there could be further matter beyond any purported boundary to the world. He 
                                                 
3 Fortin & O’Neill (1972), 340, 343. For discussion, see Grant (1979). 
4 Grant (1981), 119; and see 22 and 332 n. 20. 
5 On Aquinas, see Grant (1981), 118–119. On De Ripa, see op. cit., 132–133. On Oresme, see Grant (1969), 48 
and n. 47. On the Coimbra commentator see Grant (1969), 52 and Grant (1981), 162. Among the many other 
sources for scholastic (and, for that matter, classical Aristotelian) views in this area, these two works—Grant 
(1981) and, more succinctly, Grant (1969)—do stand out as especially thorough, erudite and useful. But 
another equally masterful treatment, and one that does diverge from Grant’s on certain points, is Duhem 
(1985). 
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really did think that there was actually existing matter everywhere, at every possible distance 
from here, no matter how great. 
 
1.2 The Indefinite and the Infinite 
As is well known, Descartes shied away from describing the universe as ‘infinitely’ large, 
preferring to call it only ‘indefinitely’ so while reserving the term ‘infinite’ for God alone. He 
offered two grounds for this distinction, one metaphysical and the other epistemological.6 
Metaphysically, Descartes regarded God as being unlimited with respect to every 
possible perfection, whereas created things, where they were unlimited at all, would only be 
so in some particular respect. In the case of the extension of the universe, he felt that it was 
boundless in magnitude: but only in magnitude, not in power, intelligence, etc.7 Even 
Descartes’s critics, much as they might have taken issue with his contention that the universe 
was boundless even in magnitude, would at least have agreed with the second part of this 
claim. The same point had been made long before Descartes,8 and it was quite 
uncontroversial: so we need say no more about it here. 
Epistemologically, Descartes felt that we could positively understand of God that there 
were no limits to his perfection, but he suggested that with created things we merely “do not 
recognize a limit,”9 and “acknowledge in a negative way that any limits which they may have 
cannot be discovered by us.”10 But this does require a few more words. As they stand, such 
comments might come across as a declaration of sheer ignorance as to whether there are any 
limits or not. In my opinion, however, it is important not to overstate the extent of Descartes’s 
epistemic humility in this matter. 
The second of those remarks, about negatively acknowledging that we cannot find any 
limits should there be such, comes from the first part of the Principles of Philosophy. But, at 
least as far as the material world was concerned, Descartes was there more concerned just 
to lay out some concepts that might turn out to be applicable to it, rather than to prove 
anything about it. It was only at the start of the second part that Descartes argued that such 
a world even existed at all. But then, once he had done so, he presented the principle of an 
unlimited universe as just one item in a wider sequence of immediate consequences of his 
theory of the nature of body as such. One can see this from the section titles alone: 
 
16. It is a contradiction to suppose there is such a thing as a vacuum, i.e. that in which 
there is nothing whatsoever. 
19. The preceding conclusion confirms what we said regarding rarefaction. 
20. The foregoing results also demonstrate the impossibility of atoms. 
21. Similarly, the extension of the world is indefinite.  
22. Similarly, the earth and the heavens are composed of one and the same matter; 
and there cannot be a plurality of worlds.11 
 
                                                 
6 Perhaps the best source here is Wilson (1986), but many others have followed her lead: see the works cited 
in n. 17 below. 
7 See the First Replies (AT VII, 113; CSM II, 81), together with the further gloss on this passage in Descartes’s 
letter to Mersenne of 31 December 1640 (AT III, 273–274; CSMK 166). 
8 For example, by John of Bassols: see Duhem (1985), 97. 
9 First Replies (AT VII, 113; CSM II, 81). 
10 Principles I.27 (AT VIII-1, 15; CSM I, 202). 
11 Principles II.16–22 (AT VIII-1, 49–52; CSM I, 229–232). 
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Descartes clearly regarded a finite world as being just as impossible as a vacuum or an 
indivisible atom, and it would appear that the ground of the impossibility in all of these 
cases—the fourth in this list as much as the first—was that such hypotheses were 
contradictory. 
In subsequent writings, Descartes would put the point even more forcefully. Writing 
to Hector-Pierre Chanut in 1647, he began by echoing the same more agnostic tone as in 
Principles I: “we cannot say that something is infinite without a reason to prove this such as 
we can give only in the case of God; but we can say that a thing is indefinite simply if we have 
no reason which proves that it has bounds.” However, in the very next sentence, he 
continued: “Now it seems to me that it is impossible to prove or even to conceive that there 
are bounds in the matter of which the world is composed” (emphasis added).12 To be unable 
to prove that the world is bounded might suggest that we cannot achieve certainty either 
way. By contrast, if we are unable even to entertain the hypothesis of a bounded world, on 
grounds of inconceivability, then it would seem that we are simply not going to be in a position 
to assent to it. And so likewise, Descartes told Henry More in 1649: “It conflicts with my 
conception, or, what is the same, I think it involves a contradiction, that the world should be 
finite or bounded.”13 
Now, taken at face value, it might seem that these stronger statements would exclude 
any kind of epistemic humility at all: if the hypothesis of a bounded universe is inconceivable 
and contradictory, then surely we can rule it out, once and for all, and just leave it at that. But 
the point is that, rather notoriously, Descartes felt that God had such supreme dominion over 
the eternal truths and essences of things that he might even be able to make a contradiction 
true. In a 1648 letter for Antoine Arnauld, Descartes applied that wider doctrine directly to 
the case of the extension of the universe: 
 
I do not think that we should ever say of anything that it cannot be brought about by 
God. For since every basis of truth and goodness depends on his omnipotence, I would 
not dare to say that God cannot make a mountain without a valley, or bring it about 
that 1 and 2 are not 3. I merely say that he has given me such a mind that I cannot 
conceive a mountain without a valley, or a sum of 1 and 2 which is not 3; such things 
involve a contradiction in my conception. I think the same should be said of a space 
which is wholly empty, or of an extended piece of nothing, or of a limited universe 
(emphasis added).14 
 
At least by the final few years of his life, Descartes was explicitly treating the suggestion that 
God might create a limited universe as being on a par with the suggestion that he might make 
1+2 unequal to 3. It was not our place to deny God that power: however, we could not grasp 
what the hypothesis would even mean. Even if God’s hands were not tied by the laws of logic, 
our minds still were. And so, to the extent that we could discern a contradiction in such 
hypotheses, we should feel confident in asserting their falsity after all. As Descartes told 
More: “It conflicts with my conception to attribute any limit to the world; and I have no 
measure of what I should affirm or deny except my own perception.”15 We owe it to God to 
                                                 
12 Descartes to Chanut, 6 June 1647 (AT V, 51–52; CSMK 320). 
13 Descartes to More, 15 April 1649 (AT V, 345; CSMK 374). 
14 Descartes for Arnauld, 29 July 1648 (AT V, 223–224; CSMK, 358–359). 
15 Descartes to More, 15 April 1649 (AT V, 344; CSMK 374). See also Descartes to More, 5 February 1649 (AT V, 
274; CSMK 364). 
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acknowledge that he might somehow recognise an absolute falsity in the hypothesis of an 
indefinite universe: but only such as will forever be bound to elude our own faculties. And, as 
Descartes asked in the Second Replies: “Why should this alleged ‘absolute falsity’ bother us, 
since we neither believe in it nor have even the smallest suspicion of it? For the supposition 
which we are making here is of a conviction so firm that it is quite incapable of being 
destroyed; and such a conviction is clearly the same as the most perfect certainty.”16 
 
1.3 The Actual Indefinite 
Even if it allowed that the material world is boundless with respect to extension, there is still 
a question over the nature of such boundlessness. It has often been claimed that Descartes’s 
distinction between the indefinite and the infinite corresponds to the Aristotelian distinction 
between the potential infinite and the actual infinite. To take just one example of many, Roger 
Ariew writes: “Descartes equates the indefinite with potential infinity, a continual increase of 
a finite amount that can never become actually infinite […]. For these purposes, in a sense, 
indefinite is classified with finite.”17 On this account, there is no distance so great that a body 
could not exist there: but there might yet be distances such that no body actually does exist 
there. Others, however, have taken issue with this interpretation. For instance, Françoise 
Broitman: “Unlike most [of] Descartes’ scholars and historians of the Infinite who take the 
position that Descartes only conceived the infinity of the world as being potential, I show that 
the Cartesian ‘indefinite’ just as it is within his mathematical physics is not potential but actual 
and effective.”18 I too would take issue, and likewise contend that the extension of Descartes’s 
universe was actually, and not just potentially, in(de)finite. 
But it is easy to see why the ‘potential infinity’ interpretation of Cartesian 
indefiniteness has had so much support. When Descartes introduced the concept in Principles 
I.26, he did indeed propose it as a potential: “There is, for example, no imaginable extension 
which is so great that we cannot understand the possibility of an even greater one, and so we 
shall describe the size of possible things as indefinite” (emphasis added).19 This possibility of 
ever greater bodies does indeed appear to be all that is actually involved in the concept of 
indefiniteness as such: any claim of actuality will be an addition to that basic notion. But it is 
clear from a letter of 1640 that Descartes did not intend to exclude such an addition. He did 
not regard these ever greater bodies as merely possible, but as at least possible: “I could not 
conceive of an indefinite quantity by looking at a very small quantity or a finite body unless 
the size of the world was actually or at least possibly indefinite” (emphasis added).20 And this 
is the reason why I do not feel that it is helpful to elucidate Descartes’s theory of the indefinite 
through a distinction between the actual and the potential infinite: because it is equally 
compatible with either. The concept itself is simply silent on that question. If one stops at the 
possibility asserted in Principles I.26, then one will be dealing with a potential indefinite. If, 
                                                 
16 Second Replies (AT VII, 145; CSM II, 103). For another example of Descartes confidence in the truth of the 
hypothesis of a boundless universe, notwithstanding his acknowledgment that God might be able to make it 
false, see the annotations he made on a copy of his own Principles at AT XI, 654. Translations of the passages in 
question can be found in Garber (1992), 153 and 345 n. 136. 
17 Ariew (1987), 149. See also Koyré (1957), 108; Nikulin (2002), 49–50, 56; Benitez Grobet (2010), 522–523, 
525. Other studies that have sought to explore Descartes’s position include Laporte (1950) 255–267, Wilson 
(1986), Kendrick (1998), Ariew (1999) 155–171, Vilmer (2008) and (2010), Broitman (2013). 
18 Broitman (2013), 108; and see 112. See also Vilmer (2008), 504–510. 
19 Principles I.26 (AT VIII-1, 15; CSM I, 202). 
20 Descartes to Regius, 24 May 1640 (AT III, 64; CSMK, 147). 
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however, one strengthens this by maintaining that these greater and greater bodies really do 
all exist, then one will be facing an actual indefinite. 
And such strengthening is precisely what we find in Descartes. When Descartes 
returned to the issue in Principles II.21, he no longer mentioned possibility: “For no matter 
where we imagine the boundaries to be, there are always some indefinitely extended spaces 
beyond them, which we not only imagine but also perceive to be imaginable in a true fashion, 
that is, real.”21 This stronger claim of actual (or ‘real’ and ‘true’) indefiniteness does go beyond 
the mere concept of indefiniteness as such, and therefore it will require further argument in 
its own right. But I will be claiming in section 3 below that such argument was indeed available 
to Descartes. 
Had Descartes been committed only to the weaker claim, there would have been 
nothing remarkable about his position at all, and no reason why he should have been worried 
about controversy. That the extension of the world should have only an infinite potential for 
increase, with more and more distant bodies being possible but not actual, was precisely the 
traditional scholastic doctrine he was trying to get away from.22 And we can find the same 
position expressed directly against Descartes by his own critics. Ralph Cudworth, for instance, 
might not have explicitly named Descartes in his discussion of the issue, but it is hard not to 
presume that he had him in mind when he wrote that “Infinite Space, beyond the Finite World, 
is a thing which hath been much talked of; and it is by some supposed to be Infinite Body.” 
But Cudworth’s own opinion was that “how vast soever the Finite World should be, yet is 
there a Possibility of more and more Magnitude and Body, still to be added to it, further and 
further, by Divine Power, Infinitely; or that the World could never be made so Great, no not 
by God himself, as that his own Omnipotence could not make it yet Greater. Which Potential 
Infinity or Indefinite Encreasableness of Corporeal Magnitude, seems to have been mistaken 
for an Actual Infinity of Space.”23 Despite the fact that Cudworth was tying the term 
‘indefinite’ to the term ‘potential infinity,’ while also embracing the latter notion, his 
position—and consequently his own sense of the former term—was wholly opposed to 
Descartes’s. Notwithstanding its potential for increase, Cudworth was affirming that the 
world was actually only finitely large. 
That this was not Descartes’s view is demonstrated by his 1647 letter to Chanut. 
There, we see Descartes boldly declaring that “the actual existence [l’existence actuelle] of 
the spaces conceived as surrounding a globe (i.e. surrounding the world as supposed finite) is 
connected with the actual existence of the same globe.”24 We will certainly be returning to 
that letter and that argument later on, and the other texts we will also be discussing in section 
2 will further underline the actuality of the indefinite extension of Descartes’s universe. Just 
for now, to illustrate Descartes’s wider willingness to embrace the actual indefinite, I shall 
turn from the indefinitely large to the parallel case of the indefinitely small. 
In the same passage quoted above from Principles I.26, after noting the possibility of 
greater and greater bodies, Descartes continued: “Again, however many parts a body is 
divided into, each of the parts can still be understood to be divisible and so we shall hold that 
quantity is indefinitely divisible.”25 To that extent, body possessed what Cudworth might have 
called ‘potential infinity or indefinite decreasableness.’ So far, so Aristotelian: see especially 
                                                 
21 Principles II.21 (AT VIII-1, 52; CSM I, 232). 
22 Several such scholastic opinions and arguments are surveyed in Duhem (1985), 73–131. 
23 Cudworth (1678), 643, 644; see also 766. 
24 Descartes to Chanut, 6 June 1647 (AT V, 53; CSMK, 320). 
25 Principles I.26 (AT VIII-1, 15; CSM I, 202). 
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Physics III.6. However, Descartes also believed that some parts of this matter were divided a 
great deal further than this. He claimed in Principles II.34 that certain circular motions would 
bring about something that we could not fully understand, even though we perceived that it 
was true: 
 
what happens is an infinite, or indefinite, division of the various particles of matter; 
and the resulting subdivisions are so numerous that however small we make a particle 
in our thought, we always understand that it is in fact divided [reipsa esse divisam] 
into other still smaller particles. […] And for this to come about, it is necessary that all 
its imaginable particles, which are in fact innumerable [revera innumerae], should shift 
their relative positions to some tiny extent. This minute shifting of position is a true 
case of division [vera divisio].26 
 
Henry More would pick him up on this, enquiring about these “actually infinite and divided 
particles [particulas actu & infinitas & diuisas],”27 in response to which Descartes reiterated 
that he “agreed in article 34 that such indefinite division of certain parts of matter sometimes 
actually [reuerâ] takes place.”28 I contend that the way Descartes here characterised the 
division of some parts of matter should also be transposed to apply to the outward extension 
of all parts of matter. Each of those ever more distant bodies was, for Descartes, as real as 
such things were ever going to get. This was no mere potential for increase through divine 
omnipotence, as the schoolmen had tended to favour. The indefiniteness of Descartes’s 
universe was actual. 
 
1.4 The Indefinite as Syncategorematic 
The scholastic distinction between actual and potential infinities ultimately had its roots in 
Aristotle’s Physics III.4–8. But so too did another scholastic distinction that I feel is more 
helpful in getting to grips with Descartes’s notion of the indefinite: namely the distinction 
between categorematic and syncategorematic infinities. 
I say this while acknowledging that one should always be cautious in applying 
Aristotelian/scholastic jargon to Descartes, and for two reasons. First, Descartes himself 
explicitly disavowed it, explaining that “it would be very difficult for me to employ the same 
terminology [as in the schools], when my own views are profoundly different.”29 Second, even 
among the schoolmen themselves, there was scant consistency in how terms like these 
actually got used. Aristotle himself had blended elements of both distinctions together into 
one, as many set theorists still do today, and as indeed did many of the schoolmen 
themselves. Ariew, for instance, quotes an explicit identification of the syncategorematic 
infinite with the potential infinite from Goclenius’s 1613 Lexicon philosophicum.30 And many 
scholars of medieval Aristotelianism will still equate them now: Grant, for instance, 
straightforwardly contrasts “an actual, or categorematic, infinite” with a “syncategorematic, 
that is, a potential infinite.”31 However, there were several medieval Aristotelians who felt 
that these two distinctions could be usefully prised apart. Grant’s identification of the 
                                                 
26 Principles II.34 (AT VIII-1, 59–60; CSM I, 239). See Garber (1992), 125–126 and 340–341 n. 36. 
27 More to Descartes, 11 December 1648 (AT V, 242). 
28 Descartes to More, 5 February 1649 (AT V, 274; CSMK, 364). 
29 Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule Three (AT X, 369; CSM I, 14). 
30 Ariew (1999), 167 n. 71. 
31 Grant (1981), 48. 
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syncategorematic/categorematic with the potential/actual might be compared with an 
equally clear-cut declaration from Pierre Duhem that the “distinction between the 
categorematic and the syncategorematic senses of infinite is completely independent from 
the distinction between potentiality and actuality.”32 For my part, I agree with Duhem. In 
particular, and to avoid any potentially misleading ambiguities, I maintain that Descartes’s 
indefinite universe should be understood as actual but syncategorematic, as I shall now define 
that term. 
The syncategorematic/categorematic distinction boils down to the question of 
whether the items in question—irrespective of whether these should be actual or potential—
can be considered collectively or only distributively. Can we affirm anything of the whole lot 
of them together as one, or only affirm it piecemeal of each one individually? In the case at 
hand for Descartes, the question is whether there is a place infinitely/indefinitely far from 
some given place—say, the present location—or merely an infinite/indefinite series of places, 
each one at some finite distance from here. 
The distinction is perhaps best exemplified by the set of natural or real numbers. There 
are infinitely many numbers, because each of them is such that there is another greater than 
it. That is to say, 
 
 (1) (n)(m)(m>n) 
 
This is the syncategorematic infinite. And yet each of these numbers individually is still finite. 
Whatever else it might be, ‘infinity’ is not a number greater than all the rest: which would 
amount to a categorematic infinite. It is not the case that 
 
 (2) (m)(n)(m>n)33 
 
Descartes’s extended universe was such that every number could represent the distance from 
here of a place; indeed, of a body. To apply formula (1) to the case at hand, then, we simply 
need to read the ‘>’ symbol to mean ‘more distant than.’ And, for each such place or body, 
there either does or at least could exist a further one. I have suggested that Descartes 
believed that this indefinite sequence of bodies was entirely actual: but the notion of the 
syncategorematic as such, just like Descartes’s concept of the indefinite, would be just as 
applicable to their merely potential existence. To capture the latter, we simply need to insert 
a modal operator into (1): 
 
 (1ʹ) (n)(m)(m>n) 
 
As we saw, (1ʹ) is all that Descartes was asserting in Principles I.26, with the stronger (1) then 
being argued for in II.21. But what Descartes never suggested was that a place or body, further 
away than every other body in this whole indefinite sequence, did or even could exist. That 
is, it is not even the case that 
 
 (2ʹ) (m)(n)(m>n) 
 
                                                 
32 Duhem (1985), 50. 
33 Certain complexities here might demand a more convoluted formulation: but the present simplification 
should, I trust, be sufficient to get the point across. 
  
9 
 
 Descartes’s general distaste for the jargon of the schools notwithstanding, he was 
certainly familiar with it, and in particular with their notion of the syncategorematic infinite. 
For it is a term that he did in fact use: albeit only on one solitary occasion, in a letter to Jean-
Baptiste Morin of 1638. He was there discussing the various movements to which a body 
might be subjected, and he wrote: “each body can have several movements, and be pushed 
by an infinity of diverse forces at the same time; always taking the word ‘infinity’ 
syncategorematically [sincatecorematice (sic)], so that those in the schools should have 
nothing therein to find fault with.”34 I have not come across any instances in Descartes’s 
writings of the opposing term, ‘categorematic’: but his use of ‘always’ in this remark does 
tend to suggest that he would never have been willing to apply that term—or at any rate, 
never to do so when the context was restricted, as here, to created things alone—any more 
than those schoolmen who surely would have found fault with him had he done so. 
When we come to look in detail, in section 2 below, at Descartes’s various 
presentations of his argument for an indefinite universe, it should become abundantly clear 
that he was pushing for such indefiniteness in precisely this syncategorematic sense. The 
principle that a place/body should exist beyond each other place/body was the very thing that 
his argument was designed to demonstrate. For instance, and to anticipate, he would tell 
Henry More: “I cannot but conceive a space beyond whatever bounds you assign to the 
universe; and on my view such a space is a genuine body.”35 To anyone who might suggest 
that the universe should come to an end at some particular finite distance from here, 
Descartes would insist upon the actual or at least possible existence of an additional body one 
place further out. And yet still only one place further out: that is, at a slightly larger but still 
finite distance. Or, if the same considerations should then be reapplied to this additional 
body, Descartes would offer yet another body, one place further out still.36 
 
2. Descartes’s Argument  
 
If a limited universe is as contradictory as that the sum of 1 and 2 is not 3, as Descartes 
eventually came to maintain, then precisely where does the contradiction lie? Descartes came 
at the issue via a conceptual analysis of the notion of a limit, with a view to showing that such 
a notion was inconsistent with the notion of extension. 
But the argument he adopted was an old one. For example, the ancient atomists had 
believed that the universe comprised infinite worlds in an infinite void, and this was one of 
the approaches they took in establishing that conclusion. If the universe was finite, argued 
Lucretius, it would certainly have a limit somewhere. However, he continued, “clearly a thing 
                                                 
34 Descartes to Morin, 13 July 1638 (AT II, 207), my translation. This was marginally before Descartes properly 
unveiled his considered distinction between the indefinite and the infinite, at a time when he was still 
prepared to apply the latter term to creatures rather than just to God alone: he did not fully articulate that 
distinction until 1641’s Meditations. 
35 Descartes to More, 15 April 1649 (AT V, 345; CSMK 375). 
36 The passage quoted earlier from Principles II.34 likewise indicates that Descartes regarded the actually 
indefinite division of some parts of matter in this same syncategorematic way: no particle is so small that it is 
not in fact divided further. Someone else (besides More) who also would pick Descartes up on that remark was 
Leibniz, who praised him for it, while also suggesting that he should have gone further (Leibniz (1969), 393): 
for Leibniz’s own opinion was that all parts of matter were infinitely divided, not just some. However, Leibniz—
always more comfortable with scholastic jargon than Descartes—was quite explicit that such infinity should be 
regarded as both actual and syncategorematic. I suggest that this Leibnizian conception of the actual 
syncategorematic—on which, see Arthur (2001), Harmer (2014), Antognazza (2015)—can be usefully 
transposed to apply to Descartes’s conceptions of both indefinite division and indefinite outward extension. 
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cannot have a limit unless there is something outside to limit it.”37 But of course there cannot 
be anything outside the universe, that being by definition the totality of everything that exists. 
The idea was that it is in the nature of a limit, a boundary, or (three-dimensionally) a surface 
that it should separate one thing from another thing. A finitely extended universe will 
therefore be unthinkable, because the very act of imagining it as terminating in a boundary 
will require us to suppose that there is more of it on the other side. 
The Stoics also adopted a similar argument, but with a twist. Unlike the atomists (or, 
for that matter, Descartes), the Stoics did believe that the corporeal cosmos was indeed only 
finitely large. However, they also felt that this corporeal world was surrounded by an infinite 
void: “it is itself necessarily limited, whereas what is outside it is a void that extends without 
limit in every direction.”38 But, again, it was precisely by contemplating the nature of a limit 
to the corporeal world that they were led to recognise the real existence of further extension 
beyond it, albeit void extension in their case. The Stoics agreed with the atomists that 
anything that was limited would need to be limited by something outside itself. What 
differentiated them was that they then introduced an additional premise: they further 
claimed that the limiting thing would need to be of a different nature from what it limited. 
Hence their two kinds of extension, corporeal on this side of the boundary and void on the 
other. 
Descartes, of course, rejected all talk of void, whether beyond a finite corporeal 
cosmos or even just in gaps between the corporeal constituents of an indefinite one. But the 
more fundamental principle, that a boundary cannot be one-sided, was precisely that on 
which his argument depended. There are five places in his writings where he offered such an 
argument, the first couple of which we have already seen: 
 
(1) There is, for example, no imaginable extension which is so great that we cannot 
understand [intelligamus] the possibility of an even greater one; and so we shall 
describe the size of possible things as indefinite.39 
 
(2) For no matter where we imagine the boundaries to be, there are always some 
indefinitely extended spaces beyond them, which we not only imagine [non modo 
imaginamur] but also perceive [percipimus] to be imaginable in a true fashion [verè 
imaginabilia], that is, real.40 
 
(3) Now if we suppose the world to be finite, we are imagining [on imagine] that beyond 
its bounds there are some spaces which are three-dimensional and so not purely 
imaginary [pas purement imaginaires], as the philosophers’ jargon has it. These spaces 
contain matter; and this matter cannot be anywhere but in the world, and this shows 
that the world extends beyond the bounds we had tried to assign to it.41 
 
(4) [N]o limit to the world can be imagined without its being understood [intelligam] that 
there is extension beyond it.42 
                                                 
37 Lucretius (1994), 33 (book I, lines 960–961). 
38 Cleomedes (2004), 21–31, at 22. 
39 Principles I.26 (AT VIII-1, 15; CSM I, 202). 
40 Principles II.21 (AT VIII-1, 52; CSM I, 232). 
41 Descartes to Chanut, 6 June 1647 (AT V, 52; CSMK, 320). 
42 Descartes for Arnauld, 29 July 1648 (AT V, 224; CSMK, 359). 
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(5) I think it involves a contradiction, that the world should be finite or bounded; because 
I cannot but conceive [concipere] a space beyond whatever bounds you assign to the 
universe; and on my view such a space is a genuine body.43 
 
As noted in the last section, passage (1) does not capture the full force of Descartes’s position: 
it suggests that an unlimited sequence of greater and greater extensions is at least possible—
albeit only in a syncategorematic sense, such that each is possible—but it remains silent on 
whether these extensions are actual. And perhaps extension can already be said to be 
indefinite on this basis alone, any claims of actuality being additional to the basic notion of 
indefiniteness as such. But passages (2) to (5) all make it clear that Descartes was indeed 
committed to the stronger claim. These spaces beyond the alleged limit are not merely 
possible: they are truly as we imagine them to be, they contain matter, and are genuine 
bodies. 
It will be observed that Descartes used a variety of epistemological terms in these 
passages. Passages (2) and (3) both suggest that what we are doing in this thought 
experiment, at least in the first instance, is imagining further extension beyond any supposed 
boundary. Now, to some degree, Descartes was simply seeking to address ‘the 
philosophers’—those great scholastic champions of extra-mundane imaginary spaces—in 
their own terms, to show how his own opinion differed from theirs. Still, there does seem to 
be more going on than just that alone. It appears from these passages that Descartes wanted 
us actually to form a mental image of this additional extension beyond any purported limit, 
to picture it in the mind’s eye.44 
But this does make sense. Earlier in his career—especially in the Rules for the Direction 
of the Mind—Descartes had gone so far as to suggest that such images were essential to our 
knowledge of extended things.45 Admittedly, by the time he was presenting the argument at 
hand, he had softened that position and come to feel that such images were dispensable. In 
the Second Meditation, for instance, he argued that our knowledge of the wax was not really 
achieved through imagination at all, but through “purely mental scrutiny.”46 However, he also 
made the point to Elisabeth of Bohemia that “body (i.e. extension, shapes and motions) can 
likewise be known by the intellect alone, but much better by the intellect aided by the 
imagination.”47 So perhaps that is what is going on in passages (2) and (3). The images we 
form of these spaces beyond the alleged limit, even if not absolutely necessary, can still prove 
a valuable aid, a springboard to launch us towards the ultimate conclusion. 
But the fact that Descartes did not think that such images were absolutely necessary 
is then backed up by passages (4) and (5): for these simply do not mention imagination at all, 
and yet Descartes still had no trouble arriving at the same conclusion. Furthermore, (2) and 
(3) themselves already make it clear that imagination is not only unnecessary: it is also 
insufficient. We do not only imagine these spaces, and they are not purely imaginary. 
However helpful the imagination might be as a starting point, something else is going to need 
                                                 
43 Descartes to More, 15 April 1649 (AT V, 345; CSMK 374–375). 
44 One work that focuses directly on the role of the imagination in this specific argument is Nikulin (2002): see 
49–50 and 193–204. Although I do not agree with everything that Nikulin says, his discussion is well worthy of 
consideration. 
45 See Sepper (1993); Clarke (2003), 78–93. 
46 Second Meditation (AT VII, 31; CSM II, 21). 
47 Descartes to Elisabeth, 28 June 1643 (AT III, 691; CSMK 227). 
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to get in on the act, to enable us to go beyond the mere image and discover the real existence 
of the thing we are imagining. As Descartes was the first to admit, the unassisted faculty of 
imagination was a decidedly unreliable resource in the search after truth. It is not at all clear 
that he would have allowed that mere imagination, obscure and confused as it frequently 
was, could be used to establish even so much as the possibility of things, let alone their real 
existence. 
However, it is clear that Descartes believed that there was indeed another 
epistemological faculty available to us here, one with the power to legitimise the move from 
such a mental image to a recognition of real existence, or even to establish the latter 
conclusion all by itself. Passage (4) states that we ‘understand’ that such bodies really exist; 
and passage (1), notwithstanding the weakness of what it is actually saying, also uses the 
same term. Neither of these passages mentions the imagination: for this was precisely the 
role of the understanding in Descartes’s epistemology, to give us a direct insight into the 
eternal truths and essences of things, one that would often not involve images at all, or, even 
when they did play an assisting role in prompting it into activity, certainly did not depend on 
them. 
In contrast to imagination, Descartes felt that a higher faculty like understanding could 
at least give us a reliable insight into possibility. He regarded it as axiomatic that possible 
existence was “contained in the concept of a limited thing,”48 and he wrote: “I know that 
everything which I clearly and distinctly understand is capable of being created by God so as 
to correspond exactly with my understanding of it” (emphasis added).49 And yet merely 
understanding concepts was still going to be of only limited value when it came to establishing 
the real existence of anything other than the self (via the cogito) and God (from the infinite 
objective reality of our idea of him). So what might warrant the stronger claim, that these 
bodies beyond the purported boundary not only do not exist solely in the mind, nor even exist 
outside the mind solely as possibilia, but are genuinely real? 
Descartes certainly felt that the real existence of any extension at all was entirely 
contingent on God’s voluntary decision to create it. God could have decided not to create 
anything at all. Or he could have created a universe containing nothing but unextended 
thinking beings, and just left it at that. Moreover, even allowing that God did create extended 
things, Descartes did not feel that our knowledge of their existence could arise directly out of 
their concept alone, but would depend on God’s veracity, coupled with the propensity he 
gave us to believe in bodies when presented with sensual perceptions, as outlined in the Sixth 
Meditation. So, if Descartes’s argument for the indefiniteness of the universe was going to 
get off the ground, it could not start from nothing, but would need to take the existence of 
some bodies for granted. And this was indeed the approach that Descartes took. His argument 
takes the existence of bodies within the alleged boundary as a starting point—established in 
advance, presumably on the basis of that Sixth Meditation argument—and then seeks to 
show that these bodies will need to be surrounded by others, and those by further others, 
and so on indefinitely. For Descartes, it is all or nothing. Either nothing extended exists at all, 
which he regarded as a false but nevertheless intelligible and non-contradictory hypothesis. 
Or an indefinite quantity of extension exists. The one option he rejected as contradictory was 
that only a finite quantity of extension should exist. 
But it follows that bodies cannot be ontologically independent of one another. The 
actual existence of any matter must entail the actual existence of all possible matter. And 
                                                 
48 Second Replies (AT VII, 166; CSM II, 117). 
49 Sixth Meditation (AT VII, 78; CSM II, 54). 
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Descartes did indeed assert an ontological dependence among the parts of space, in the 1647 
letter to Chanut. The letter had been prompted by certain theological concerns, expressed by 
Queen Christina of Sweden and reported to Descartes by Chanut, among which was the fear 
that, if one admits a world that is infinite in matter and substance, this will undermine its 
creation in finite time.50 If matter must exist beyond any imagined spatial boundary, then 
should it not, by the same token, exist both before any imagined temporal creation and after 
any imagined temporal destruction, thereby making matter necessarily existent and 
independent of God? The same concern about Descartes’s position was frequently expressed 
by others over the next few decades.51 Indeed, it became especially acute after 1671, when 
the Cartesian physicist, Jacques Rohault, actually came unnervingly close to accepting that 
conclusion, that matter was uncreated and indestructible.52 
However, Descartes attempted to reassure Christina on this point, writing to Chanut 
as follows: 
 
If we consider the extension of the world in this way [i.e., as indefinite] and then 
compare it with its duration, it seems to me that the only thought it occasions is that 
there is no imaginable time before the creation of the world in which God could not 
have created it if he had so willed. I do not think that we have any grounds for 
concluding that he really did create it an indefinitely long time ago. For the actual or 
real existence [l’existence actuelle ou veritable] of the world during these last five or 
six thousand years is not necessarily connected [necessairement iointe] with the 
possible or imaginary existence [l’existence possible ou imaginaire] which it might 
have had before then, in the way that the actual existence [l’existence actuelle] of the 
spaces conceived as surrounding a globe (i.e. surrounding the world as supposed 
finite) is connected [iointe] with the actual existence [l’existence actuelle] of the same 
globe.53 
 
Here, Descartes was explicitly contrasting the merely possible existence of the world before 
any given moment of time, and its actual existence beyond any given point of space. And his 
grounds for this distinction lay in a contention that there was a necessary connection between 
the actual existence of the spaces surrounding a body such as a globe and that of the globe 
itself, a connection that did not hold across temporal boundaries. 
On the face of it, it might seem—and it has been argued in the secondary literature, 
for instance by Jean Laporte54—that this is flying in the face of what Descartes said elsewhere 
about the real distinction between different regions of the extended world. For instance, in 
Descartes’s principal discussion of the nature of a real distinction, he wrote of extended or 
corporeal substance that, “if it exists, each and every part of it, as delimited by us in our 
thought, is really distinct from the other parts of the same substance.” And he spelled out 
                                                 
50 Chanut to Descartes, 11 May 1647 (AT X, 620–621). 
51 See, for instance, Barrow (1734), 169; La Grange (1675), 400–401; Leibniz (2001), 25; Babin (1679), 40; 
Rochon (1685), 27–35; Du Hamel (1692), 209. 
52 See Rohault (1729) I, 19, 25. It is easy enough to find a way of reading Rohault that does not require us to 
project that conclusion onto him: but his contemporaries were not always so charitable in their own readings. 
See Samuel Clarke in the same volume, 24 n. 1 and 30 n. 2; and La Grange (1675), 393–402. 
53 Descartes to Chanut, 6 June 1647 (AT V, 52–53; CSMK, 320). Descartes also considered the same objection, 
though more briefly, in the annotations he made to a copy of his own Principles (AT XI, 656). The passage in 
question is translated in Ariew (1987), 151. 
54 Laporte (1950), 264–266. 
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what a real distinction amounted to: it “exists only between two or more substances,” such 
that God will always retain the power of “keeping one in being without the other.”55 Or again, 
Descartes made much the same point in a 1642 letter to Guillaume Gibieuf: “I consider the 
two halves of a part of matter, however small it may be, as two complete substances.”56 As 
he explained the expression in the Fourth Replies, Descartes meant by ‘complete substance’ 
that each of these halves, considered as a body in its own right, would require nothing else 
(apart from God) to sustain it in existence: it could subsist on its own.57 There does appear, at 
least prima facie, to be a challenge in reconciling such remarks with Descartes’s claims about 
a necessary connection between one body and other, surrounding bodies. 
But the crucial thing to observe is that Descartes never suggested that there was a 
necessary connection between a body and any particular surroundings. All bodies were, after 
all, supposed to be mobile: but motion, for Descartes, meant precisely that the body would 
relinquish its spatial relations to its immediate surroundings, and become surrounded by 
some other set of bodies instead.58 This body certainly did not need to be connected to that 
body, and the one could perfectly well be conserved in existence without the other. But it 
might yet need to be connected to some body or other. The latter is all that Descartes actually 
suggested to Chanut (and elsewhere) when rejecting the notion of a bounded universe, and 
it is not so clear after all that there is any conflict between this weaker claim and the real 
distinction between bodies. Descartes did not care which bodies might turn out to surround 
a supposedly finite world, but merely insisted that some should. 
And yet one might still wonder what—if anything—would entitle Descartes even just 
to the weaker conclusion. After all, many people in his own era, even when writing directly in 
response to his claims, simply rejected it. They instead fell back on the traditional scholastic 
line that, although it was perfectly possible that further extension should exist beyond the 
boundary of the finite world, none actually did so. 
Let us take just two examples. First, Isaac Barrow laid out a theory of space in the tenth 
of his Mathematical Lectures, delivered in 1665. Most of the first half of the lecture was 
directed against Descartes’s position, following which Barrow proceeded to offer his own 
alternative proposal. “Space,” he wrote, “is nothing else but the mere Power, Capacity, 
Ponibility, or (begging pardon for the Expressions) Interponibility of Magnitude.” By 
‘magnitude,’ he meant specifically corporeal bulk, and by his own neologism ‘ponibility’ (from 
the Latin ponere, to put), he meant simply that it was possible that such bulk should be put 
into such space. As he explained: “There lies no Body, there is found no actual Dimension 
beyond the Mass of the Universe; but it is possible for a Body to be constituted and a real 
Dimension to be extended beyond that itself, i.e. there is an Ultramundane Space.”59 And the 
important thing to observe here is that Barrow was not only saying that there lies no body 
beyond the finite universe, but that there are no actual dimensions there at all, not even those 
of a void. As we noted in the last section, Barrow was taking the same line as figures like 
Oresme or the Coimbra commentator had done. His ultramundane space was quite unlike the 
void of the Stoics which, as we noted at the start of this one, extended without limit in every 
direction. Barrow’s space was not actually extended at all: “it has no actual but only potential 
                                                 
55 Principles I.60 (AT VIII-1, 28–29; CSM I, 213). 
56 Descartes to Gibieuf, 19 January 1642 (AT III, 477; CSMK, 202–203). 
57 Fourth Replies (AT VII, 220–222; CSM II, 155–157). See also the Second Replies (AT VII, 120–121; CSM II, 85–
86). 
58 Principles II.25 (AT VIII-1, 53; CSM I, 233). We will be returning to this point in section 3 below. 
59 Barrow (1734), 176. 
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Figures, Dimensions and Parts consentaneous to its Nature.”60 Although quantities, 
measurable in feet or yards or miles, might be assigned to such an ultramundane space, it 
was not to the space itself that these quantities properly belonged, but only to the bodies 
that could (but did not actually, or did not yet) exist therein. 
Second, a few years later, Jean-Baptiste de La Grange argued against Descartes in 
much the same way, in chapter 29 of his own Principes de la philosophie, a chapter entitled 
“Place and Space are nothing positive.” La Grange recognised the force of the arguments that 
seemed to be pressing for the existence of further spaces beyond the boundary of a world 
imagined as finite, and he was comfortable in embracing that conclusion, just as long as it was 
rightly understood. But the trick was, just as with Barrow, to regard space as nothing positive, 
and as possessing no real extension of its own. “Space, properly speaking, is a certain capacity 
of receiving a body […]. That being granted, I say that there are true spaces beyond the 
heavens. That is evident, since there are capacities there, proper for receiving the bodies that 
God could create there, and God could produce beyond the heavens several other worlds 
similar to this one.”61 However, although it could be truly said that there were spaces out 
there, and these spaces were indeed real in their own manner, what they did not constitute 
was a “positive extension.”62 La Grange accepted that space was unbounded, just as (he 
observed) the Cartesians themselves were well persuaded. He also believed that space could 
not be produced or destroyed. However, he could not accept either point as applicable to 
matter, and this was his solution: far from treating space as material, he treated it as a 
“nothing.”63 It was merely the possibility of matter, rather than an actually extended—or even 
actually existing—thing in its own right. It was unlimited, but only in the sense that God 
possessed an unlimited creative power. It could not be produced, but only in the sense that 
God did not produce his own power to produce things. And it could not be destroyed, but 
only in the sense that God did not have the power to take away his own power. 
These, then, were the two positions. On the one hand, traditionalists were perfectly 
happy to allow the possibility of further extension on the other side of the boundary of a 
limited universe, just as long as this was acknowledged as a mere possibility. On the other 
hand, Descartes insisted that there should actually be further extension—and corporeal 
extension at that—beyond any supposed boundary (entailing, of course, that it was not a 
genuine boundary after all). Neither side ever managed to persuade the other, and ultimately 
one might wonder whether this just came down to a battle of intuitions. Descartes felt that, 
if an extended substance was going to be limited, it would need to be limited by another 
extended substance, really existing beyond itself in order to demarcate its boundary. But 
opponents like Barrow or La Grange simply did not accept that premise. They did not think 
that a limited extended substance would need to be limited by anything beyond it at all, 
neither by further matter, nor even by an actually extended void. Unless some further 
consideration can be brought to bear, to decide between these two attitudes, we seem to be 
in a stand-off. 
 
3. Descartes and Malebranche on the Ontology of Modes 
 
                                                 
60 Barrow (1734), 177. 
61 La Grange (1675), 403. My translation. 
62 La Grange (1675), 406–407. 
63 La Grange (1675), 408. 
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Descartes believed that the actual indefiniteness of the extended world was something we 
understood. Whether or not the imagination might also happen to play an assisting role along 
the way, it was the understanding that was doing all the real work. So what was it that the 
understanding was latching onto? Precisely why did that principle, that a limit could not be 
one-sided but would need to separate one thing from another thing, so appeal to Descartes? 
I suggest that the answer lies in Descartes’s conception of a mode of extension. 
To illustrate and explain this, and in hopes of resolving the stand-off between those 
who accepted the principle and those who simply did not, let us turn to another figure who 
disagreed with Descartes on this point: namely, Nicolas Malebranche. The reason why this 
case is especially worthy of attention is because, whereas Barrow and La Grange were avowed 
opponents of Descartes, Malebranche was in many ways a Cartesian. He drew heavily on 
Descartes’s ideas and arguments, employing them to his own ends in a wide range of different 
areas of philosophy, and only deviating from the orthodox Cartesian party line when he felt 
the force of argument required it. But this was one such occasion. 
The first difference between Malebranche and Descartes lay in the fact that the 
former did not feel that it could be demonstrated that any material extension existed at all. 
Perhaps faith might warrant such a conclusion: but it could not be established on 
philosophical grounds alone.64 Moreover, even allowing that some kind of extended world 
had indeed been created, Malebranche was still far from persuaded that it would need to be 
either infinite or indefinite, even just with respect to its extension alone. He was satisfied that 
the idea of extension was infinite, both in itself (because he regarded it as consubstantial with 
an infinitely perfect God) and representatively (insofar as it could represent infinitely many 
possible bodies). But he wrote in his Méditations chrétiennes et métaphysiques of 1683: “The 
idea you have of extension represents it to you as divisible, mobile, impenetrable: judge 
without fear that it has these properties essentially. But do not judge that it should be either 
immense or eternal. It might not exist at all, or it might have very narrow boundaries.”65 By 
saying only that created extension might have narrow boundaries, it seems that Malebranche 
was not closing the door altogether on Descartes’s theory of an unbounded universe. But it is 
also abundantly clear that he was far from committed to the truth of such a theory, and still 
less to its necessary truth. 
Some thirty years after making that remark in his Méditations, Malebranche would 
have occasion to echo it the course of an epistolary discussion of Spinoza’s philosophy with 
Jean-Jacques Dortous de Mairan. At one point, Mairan happened to argue in a Spinozistic way 
that extension could not be finite: either it did not exist at all, or it existed as infinite. To this 
end, he established the following lemma: “To be finite in its kind, it is necessary to be 
delimited by something of the same kind or the same nature.” And he illustrated this by 
reference to bodies: “Let there be A, a finite body: it is evident that it is bounded and delimited 
by all the surrounding bodies B, C, D, etc., which are extended like it or which have extension 
in common with it, and beyond which it does not extend; and if there were no body, nor 
anything extended, around A, I could not avoid affirming of body A that it is infinite in its kind; 
for to be delimited by nothing, not to be delimited, is to be infinite.”66 The underlying principle 
here was coming from Spinoza’s Ethics (Part One, Definition 2): but, as we have seen, it was 
also the principle at the heart of Descartes’s argument for an indefinite universe. For one 
extended thing to be limited, it would need to be limited by another extended thing. 
                                                 
64 Malebranche (1997), 571–575. 
65 Malebranche (1958–1984) X, 100. My translation. See also XVII-1, 286–287. 
66 Malebranche (1995), 94–95. 
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Malebranche, however, disagreed. In response to Mairan, he wrote: 
 
Roundness is, according to all the world, the modification of substance, or of the 
extension of the sphere, because we cannot conceive of roundness without extension. 
I can conceive the sphere A, and it can exist all alone. “No,” he would say, “that sphere 
would be infinite, for what would delimit it?” Nothing, I would say. For to delimit it, 
nothing is needed: it suffices for it to be as it is. The roundness of the sphere belongs 
only to the sphere, and does not depend on anything that surrounds it; whether it be 
the air or nothing, that is the same thing. “But don’t you conceive of extension as 
infinite?” Yes, the idea of extension is infinite, but its ideatum possibly not. Perhaps it 
has in fact no ideatum.67 
 
The contrast between this 1714 letter from Malebranche to Mairan and the 1647 letter from 
Descartes to Chanut, quoted above, should be clear. Both were using the example of a solitary 
sphere: but Descartes was arguing that it could not be so solitary after all, because its own 
extension would be necessarily connected with the actual existence of further extension 
beyond it, whereas Malebranche was arguing that, on the contrary, it did not need anything 
else to delimit it. To be defined by a round boundary—and a fortiori to have a boundary at 
all, that is, to be finite—was simply the way it was. In 1950, Laporte would draw on 
Malebranche to argue that Descartes had not been entitled to claim that there was a 
necessary connection between a finite world supposed spherical, and the real existence of 
further bodies beyond it. “In taking it for limited,” wrote Laporte, “we are not supposing that 
it is contained in another thing, but on the contrary that it leaves no space outside itself, either 
empty or full. So is it limited by nothing? It is limited by the deficiencies of its own substance, 
which extends as far as it extends and no further.”68 
What it really comes down to is this: does a mode or modification (such as roundness) 
belong to one individual body, simply in itself, or does it more properly belong to multiple 
bodies, to the one that interests us only in relation to others? 
Malebranche took the former line. In his opinion, the boundary of an extended thing, 
together with its particular figure (“since figure is nothing but the boundary of extension”69), 
was in fact identical with the thing itself, existing in a certain way: “the actual roundness and 
motion of a body are but that body shaped and moved in this or that way.”70 And so, although 
a modification/mode could not be perceived without a perception of the substance to which 
it belonged, it could perfectly well be perceived without a perception of anything else. As 
early as the opening chapter of Malebranche’s first published work, The Search after Truth, 
he was already claiming that “a figure is round when all the exterior parts of a body are equally 
distant from one of its parts called its center, independently of any external body” (emphasis 
added).71 And so likewise at the end of his life, we find him telling Mairan that figures and 
other such modifications of extended things belong to those things themselves, and are not 
conceivable without them, in contrast to the things themselves which, together with their 
modifications, can be conceived without—and can exist without—any other extended things 
                                                 
67 Malebranche (1995), 104. 
68 Laporte (1950), 264. My translation. 
69 Malebranche (1997), 626. 
70 Malebranche (1997), 218. 
71 Malebranche (1997), 3. 
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to surround them.72 What impediment, therefore, could there be to a finite universe, 
confined within a spherical boundary? 
Descartes, however, went down the latter path, and felt that a spherical boundary 
would need to be demarcated by things on both sides of it: for, strictly speaking, this one 
mode was shared between those things. It was, to borrow an expression from Paul Hoffman, 
a ‘straddling mode.’73 In a discussion ostensibly unrelated to the size of the universe, instead 
expounding how he thought Transubstantiation might work, Descartes happened to address 
the ontological status of a surface. He observed that a surface was not a substance in its own 
right, but “only a mode or manner of being, which cannot be changed without a change in 
that in which or through which it exists.”74 But in or through what did this surface exist? 
Descartes explained: “This surface intermediate between the air and the bread does not differ 
in reality from the surface of the bread, or from the surface of the air touching the bread; 
these three surfaces are in fact a single thing and differ only in relation to our thought.”75 For 
some purposes, perhaps when reflecting on the fact that it could be surrounded by things 
other than air, we might choose to focus our attention on the outer surface of the bread. On 
other occasions, when reflecting on the fact that the same air might find itself surrounding 
something other than bread (e.g., the body of Christ), we might consider the inner surface of 
the air. And sometimes we might focus on the interface as such between the two things. But 
the object of our thought would be just the same in all three cases, and this one common 
surface belonged properly neither to the air alone, nor to the bread alone, but to both 
together. 
Of surfaces in general, so too of their shapes, shape being merely “a function of the 
boundaries of this extension.”76 When arguing against the possibility of a vacuum, Descartes 
claimed that, if God was to remove the contents of a vessel without replacement, the sides 
of the vessel would have to touch. In the course of that discussion, he wrote that, “although 
there is no connection between a vessel and this or that particular body contained in it, there 
is a very strong and wholly necessary connection between the concave shape of the vessel 
and the extension, taken in a general sense, which must be contained in the concave shape.”77 
The similarity between this comment, concerning the necessary connection between the 
concave inner surface of the vessel and the extension within, and the necessary connection 
that Descartes described to Chanut between the convex outer surface of a world supposed 
finite and the extension without, should be clear. Again, a finite world would not need to be 
surrounded by any particular bodies, but it would need to be surrounded by some bodies or 
other: for otherwise its spherical boundary—as a mode that should belong equally to the 
objects on both sides, that being the nature of surfaces in general—would be missing one of 
its requisite relata. 
And this was not specific to surfaces and their shapes. The same point applies, I 
contend, to all the other modes of extension too: they were all straddling. Descartes did not 
countenance many such things, but only those that were required by his mechanical physics, 
so we can go through them one by one. 
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In the case of external place, for instance, Descartes defined this simply as “the surface 
immediately surrounding what is in the place.”78 As he acknowledged, this was effectively the 
same as the old Aristotelian definition of the place of a thing as “the innermost motionless 
boundary of what contains it.”79 But, as we have just seen, Descartes believed that such a 
boundary would properly belong to what was contained as much as to what contained it. He 
reiterated the same point he had elsewhere made for surfaces considered more generally, 
but now with specific application to the role that such surfaces would play as external places. 
The surface that constituted the place, he wrote, was not “any part of the surrounding body 
but merely the boundary between the surrounding and surrounded bodies, which is no more 
than a mode. Or rather what is meant is simply the common surface, which is not a part of 
one body rather than the other but is always reckoned to be the same, provided it keeps the 
same size and shape.”80 
As for external place, so too for motion, that being simply a change of place. For 
Descartes, the motion of a body would always need to make references to its surroundings. 
He defined motion as “the transfer of one piece of matter, or one body, from the vicinity of 
the other bodies which are in immediate contact with it, and which are regarded as being at 
rest, to the vicinity of other bodies.”81 But then it followed that motion, our customary ways 
of describing it notwithstanding, should be entirely reciprocal. Strictly speaking, it was not so 
much that a moving body would be leaving its stationary surroundings, but rather that the 
body and its surroundings would both be equally moving in relation to one another. And 
Descartes was perfectly happy to embrace this conclusion: “For transfer is in itself a reciprocal 
process: we cannot understand that a body AB is transferred from the vicinity of a body CD 
without simultaneously understanding that CD is transferred from the vicinity of AB. Exactly 
the same force and action is needed on both sides.”82 Or again, in the very next paragraph: 
“whatever is real and positive in moving bodies—that in virtue of which they are said to 
move—is also to be found in the other bodies which are contiguous with them, even though 
these are regarded merely as being at rest.”83 
Of course, the same point also holds for rest itself. One might think that this would go 
without saying: but we should remember that Descartes did not regard rest as simply the 
limiting case of motion (i.e., a motion where the speed happens to be zero), but as a distinct 
mode in its own right, wholly opposed to it. So, for the record, just as motion was the 
reciprocal transfer of a body away from its surroundings, rest was the absence of such a 
transfer.84 That is to say, the definition of rest for one body would still make an ineliminable 
reference to other bodies. 
The size or quantity of a body might look like an exception here: for perhaps that can, 
after all, be understood solely in terms of the three-dimensional extension that constitutes 
the body itself, without any reference to surrounding bodies. But then, strictly speaking, size 
was not a mode of extension. Descartes acknowledged this in Principles II.8: “There is no real 
difference between quantity and the extended substance; the difference is merely a 
                                                 
78 Principles II.15 (AT VIII-1, 48; CSM I, 229). 
79 Aristotle (1984) I, 361 (Physics IV.4, 212a20); see Descartes to Mersenne, 23 June 1641 (AT III, 387; passage 
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conceptual one.”85 And he elaborated in a letter: whereas shape and motion were true modes 
of corporeal substance, size—together with existence, duration, number and all universals—
were rather to be taken as “attributes, or modes of thinking, because […] the thing itself 
cannot be outside our thought without its existence, or without its duration or size, and so 
on.”86 Far from being a mode of a corporeal substance, the size of a body just was that 
corporeal substance itself. The two things could be considered apart, but not by a modal 
distinction—and still less by a real distinction—but only by a distinction of reason. 
The same, however, was not the case for internal place. Much as Descartes’s notion 
of external place had linked it directly to the two-dimensional (i.e., depthless) surface 
intermediate between the body and its surroundings, his notion of internal place linked that 
directly to the three-dimensional extension that constituted the body. And yet, even despite 
this, the notion still managed to involve a reference to the surroundings. Descartes identified 
the internal place of a body with the body’s own extension: but only insofar as it was being 
considered generically, rather than as something individual. And how, precisely, was that 
genus defined? According to Descartes, the internal place of a body will remain one and the 
same, even if the individual body in question should happen to leave it, just as long as the 
extension that constitutes whatever comes to replace that body “retains the same size and 
shape and keeps the same position relative to certain external bodies which we use to 
determine the space in question” (emphasis added).87 
In short, every single one of the true modes of corporeal substance—surfaces together 
with their shapes, motion and rest, and both internal and external place—needs to be 
referred not only to the individual body to which we might be accustomed to ascribing them, 
but to other bodies too. Where Malebranche believed that a mode of a thing was just that 
thing itself, existing in a certain way, independently of all other things, Descartes believed 
that modes—at any rate, the corporeal ones—were relational in nature. Any property that 
was not thus relational but inhered in the substance itself (substantiae inesse) would, properly 
speaking, qualify not as a mode thereof but an attribute.88 And that did include size: but it did 
not include any of these others. 
But Aristotle had long since recognised that his own relational definition of place, as 
the innermost boundary of what contained a thing, entailed that the cosmos as a whole could 
not have a place, on the grounds that nothing contained it.89 Had Descartes followed Aristotle 
in treating the universe as finite, the same entailment would have held for him too, and not 
only for place but right across the board. Maybe a single finite body, all alone in the world, 
could somehow—paradoxically—have a size. But it could not have a place; it could neither 
move nor be at rest; it could not have a shape; and, most fundamentally of all, it could not 
have a boundary. 
It is this, I contend, that was driving Descartes’s argument for the actual indefiniteness 
of the universe. Indefiniteness as such might only require the possibility of increase beyond 
any given point: that is, a syncategorematic sequence of expansions, this potential body 
beyond that one, and that beyond another, though without any suggestion of anything 
beyond the whole sequence together. But Descartes went a lot further than this, and made it 
clear that each of these more and more distant bodies should be not only possible but actual. 
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To recall what he told Chanut, the actual existence of spaces surrounding a supposedly finite 
world is necessarily connected with the actual existence of that world. We can now see why 
Descartes was so confident in this, and precisely what he thought the understanding was 
latching onto here, when we recognised a contradiction in the supposition of a world that was 
actually only finitely large. To be finite just is to be bounded. But the notion of a boundary to 
the whole extended world will be self-defeating, because the very act of supposing such a 
boundary will reveal further extension beyond it, actually existing to provide the second 
relatum that every boundary requires. 
 
Abbreviations 
 
AT Descartes, René. 1996. Oeuvres de Descartes, edited by Charles Adam and Paul 
Tannery. 11 vols. Paris: J. Vrin. 
CSM Descartes, René. 1984–1985. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, translated by 
John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
CSMK Descartes, René. 1991. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. III: The 
Correspondence, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, 
Anthony Kenny. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
References 
 
Antognazza, Maria Rosa 
2015 “The Hypercategorematic Infinite.” The Leibniz Review 25: 5–30. 
Ariew, Roger 
1987 “The Infinite in Descartes’ Conversation with Burman.” Archiv für geschichte 
der philosophie 69(2): 140–163. 
Ariew, Roger 
1999 Descartes and the Last Scholastics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Aristotle 
1984 The Complete Works, edited by Jonathan Barnes. 2 vols. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Arthur, Richard 
2001 “Leibniz on Infinite Number, Infinite Wholes, and the Whole World.” The 
Leibniz Review 11: 103–116. 
[Babin, François] 
1679 Journal ou relation fidelle de tout ce qui s’est passé dans l’université d’Angers 
au sujet de la philosophie de Des Carthes. No place: no publisher. 
Barrow, Isaac 
1734 The Usefulness of Mathematical Learning, translated by John Kirkby. London: 
Stephen Austen. 
Benitez Grobet, Laura 
2010 “Is Descartes a Materialist? The Descartes-More Controversy about the 
Universe as Indefinite.” Dialogue 49(4): 517–526. 
Broitman, Françoise Monnoyeur 
2013 “The Indefinite within Descartes’ Mathematical Physics.” Eidos, 19: 106–121.  
Clarke, Desmond 
  
22 
 
2003 Descartes’s Theory of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cleomedes 
2004 Lectures on Astronomy, translated by Alan C. Bowen and Robert B. Todd. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Cudworth, Ralph 
1678 The True Intellectual System of the Universe. London: Richard Royston. 
Du Hamel, Jean 
1692 Reflexions critiques sur le systeme cartesien de Mr Regis. Paris: Edme Couterot. 
Duhem, Pierre 
1985 Medieval Cosmology: Theories of Infinity, Place, Time, Void, and the Plurality 
of Worlds, edited and translated by Roger Ariew. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Fortin, Ernest L., and O’Neill, Peter D. 
1972 “Condemnation of 219 Propositions,” in Medieval Political Philosophy: A 
Sourcebook, edited by Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, pp. 335–354. 
Garber, Daniel 
1992 Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Grant, Edward 
1969 “Medieval and Seventeenth-Century Conceptions of an Infinite Void Space 
beyond the Cosmos.” Isis 60(1): 39–60. 
Grant, Edward 
1979 “The Condemnation of 1277, God’s Absolute Power, and Physical Thought in 
the Late Middle Ages.” Viator 10: 211–244. 
Grant, Edward 
1981 Much Ado About Nothing: Theories of space and vacuum from the Middle Ages 
to the Scientific Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Harmer, Adam 
2014 “Leibniz on Infinite Numbers, Infinite Wholes, and Composite Substances.” 
British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22(2): 236–259. 
Hoffman, Paul 
2009 “Cartesian Passions and Cartesian Dualism,” in his Essays on Descartes. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 105–124. 
Kendrick, Nancy 
1998 “Uniqueness in Descartes’ ‘Infinite’ and ‘Indefinite.’” History of Philosophy 
Quarterly 15(1): 23–36. 
Koyré, Alexandre 
1957 From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 
La Grange, J[ean]-B[aptiste] de 
1675 Les principes de la philosophie. Paris: Georges Josse. 
Laporte, Jean 
1950 Le rationalisme de Descartes, nouvelle édition revue et augmentée. Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France. 
Leibniz, G.W. 
1969 Philosophical Papers and Letters, edited by Leroy E. Loemker, second edition. 
Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 
Leibniz, G.W. 
  
23 
 
2001 The Labyrinth of the Continuum, translated and edited by Richard T.W. Arthur. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Lucretius 
1994 On the Nature of the Universe, translated by R.E. Latham, revised by John 
Godwin. London: Penguin. 
Malebranche, Nicolas 
1958–1984 Oeuvres completes, edited by André Robinet. 20 vols. Paris: J. Vrin. 
Malebranche, Nicolas 
1995 Malebranche’s First and Last Critics, translated by Richard A. Watson and 
Marjorie Grene. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University 
Press. 
Malebranche, Nicolas 
1997 The Search after Truth, translated and edited by Thomas M. Lennon and Paul 
J. Olscamp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Nikulin, Dmitri 
2002 Matter, Imagination and Geometry: Ontology, natural philosophy and 
mathematics in Plotinus, Proclus and Descartes. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
[Rochon, Antoine] 
1685 Lettre d’un philosophe à un cartesien. Paris: Daniel de la Ville. 
Rohault, Jacques 
1729 Rohault’s System of Natural Philosophy, illustrated with Dr. Samuel Clarke’s 
Notes, translated by John Clarke. Second edition, 2 vols. London: James and 
John Knapton. 
Sepper, Dennis L. 
1993 “Ingenium, Memory Art, and the Unity of Imaginative Knowing in the Early 
Descartes,” in Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes, edited 
by Stephen Voss. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 142–161. 
Vilmer, Jean-Baptiste Jeangène 
2008 “La véritable nature de l’indéfini cartésien.” Revue de métaphysique et de 
morale 60: 503–515. 
Vilmer, Jean-Baptiste Jeangène 
2010 “Descartes et les bornes de l’univers: l’indéfini physique.” Philosophiques, 
37(2): 299–323. 
Wilson, Margaret D. 
1986 “Can I Be the Cause of My Idea of the World? (Descartes on the Infinite and 
Indefinite),” in Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, edited by Amélie Oksenberg 
Rorty. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 339–358. 
